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Apr 19, 2012 Hi everybody, I want a complete list of Windows XP,Server 2003 and 2008 (R2) EventID codes and meanings.If anybody helps I'll be appreciated. Thx for your help.
Applies to
- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016
Subcategory:Audit Logon
Event Description:
This event generates when a logon session is created (on destination machine). It generates on the computer that was accessed, where the session was created.
Note For recommendations, see Security Monitoring Recommendations for this event.
Event XML:
Required Server Roles: None.
Minimum OS Version: Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista.
Event Versions:
0 - Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista.
1 - Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.
- Added “Impersonation Level” field.
2 – Windows 10.
Added “Logon Information:” section.
Logon Type moved to “Logon Information:” section.
Added “Restricted Admin Mode” field.
Added “Virtual Account” field.
Added “Elevated Token” field.
Added “Linked Logon ID” field.
Added “Network Account Name” field.
Added “Network Account Domain” field.
Field Descriptions:
Subject:
- Security ID [Type = SID]: SID of account that reported information about successful logon or invokes it. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event.
Note A security identifier (SID) is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see Security identifiers.
Account Name [Type = UnicodeString]: the name of the account that reported information about successful logon.
Account Domain [Type = UnicodeString]: subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO
Lowercase full domain name: contoso.local
Uppercase full domain name: CONTOSO.LOCAL
For some well-known security principals, such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is “NT AUTHORITY”.
For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: “Win81”.
Logon ID [Type = HexInt64]: hexadecimal value that can help you correlate this event with recent events that might contain the same Logon ID, for example, “4672(S): Special privileges assigned to new logon.”
Logon Information [Version 2]:
- Logon Type [Version 0, 1, 2] [Type = UInt32]: the type of logon which was performed. The table below contains the list of possible values for this field.
Logon types and descriptions
Logon Type | Logon Title | Description |
---|---|---|
2 | Interactive | A user logged on to this computer. |
3 | Network | A user or computer logged on to this computer from the network. |
4 | Batch | Batch logon type is used by batch servers, where processes may be executing on behalf of a user without their direct intervention. |
5 | Service | A service was started by the Service Control Manager. |
7 | Unlock | This workstation was unlocked. |
8 | NetworkCleartext | A user logged on to this computer from the network. The user's password was passed to the authentication package in its unhashed form. The built-in authentication packages all hash credentials before sending them across the network. The credentials do not traverse the network in plaintext (also called cleartext). |
9 | NewCredentials | A caller cloned its current token and specified new credentials for outbound connections. The new logon session has the same local identity, but uses different credentials for other network connections. |
10 | RemoteInteractive | A user logged on to this computer remotely using Terminal Services or Remote Desktop. |
11 | CachedInteractive | A user logged on to this computer with network credentials that were stored locally on the computer. The domain controller was not contacted to verify the credentials. |
Restricted Admin Mode [Version 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: Only populated for RemoteInteractive logon type sessions. This is a Yes/No flag indicating if the credentials provided were passed using Restricted Admin mode. Restricted Admin mode was added in Win8.1/2012R2 but this flag was added to the event in Win10.
Reference: http://blogs.technet.com/b/kfalde/archive/2013/08/14/restricted-admin-mode-for-rdp-in-windows-8-1-2012-r2.aspx.
If not a RemoteInteractive logon, then this will be '-' string.
Virtual Account [Version 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: a “Yes” or “No” flag, which indicates if the account is a virtual account (e.g., 'Managed Service Account'), which was introduced in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 to provide the ability to identify the account that a given Service uses, instead of just using 'NetworkService'.
Elevated Token [Version 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: a “Yes” or “No” flag. If “Yes” then the session this event represents is elevated and has administrator privileges.
Impersonation Level [Version 1, 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: can have one of these four values:
SecurityAnonymous (displayed as empty string): The server process cannot obtain identification information about the client, and it cannot impersonate the client. It is defined with no value given, and thus, by ANSI C rules, defaults to a value of zero.
SecurityIdentification (displayed as 'Identification'): The server process can obtain information about the client, such as security identifiers and privileges, but it cannot impersonate the client. This is useful for servers that export their own objects, for example, database products that export tables and views. Using the retrieved client-security information, the server can make access-validation decisions without being able to use other services that are using the client's security context.
SecurityImpersonation (displayed as 'Impersonation'): The server process can impersonate the client's security context on its local system. The server cannot impersonate the client on remote systems. This is the most common type.
SecurityDelegation (displayed as 'Delegation'): The server process can impersonate the client's security context on remote systems.
New Logon:
- Security ID [Type = SID]: SID of account for which logon was performed. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event.
Note A security identifier (SID) is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see Security identifiers.
Account Name [Type = UnicodeString]: the name of the account for which logon was performed.
Account Domain [Type = UnicodeString]: subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO
Lowercase full domain name: contoso.local
Uppercase full domain name: CONTOSO.LOCAL
For some well-known security principals, such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is “NT AUTHORITY”.
For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: “Win81”.
Logon ID [Type = HexInt64]: hexadecimal value that can help you correlate this event with recent events that might contain the same Logon ID, for example, “4672(S): Special privileges assigned to new logon.”
Linked Logon ID [Version 2] [Type = HexInt64]: A hexadecimal value of the paired logon session. If there is no other logon session associated with this logon session, then the value is “0x0”.
Network Account Name [Version 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: User name that will be used for outbound (network) connections. Valid only for NewCredentials logon type.
If not NewCredentials logon, then this will be a '-' string.
Network Account Domain [Version 2] [Type = UnicodeString]: Domain for the user that will be used for outbound (network) connections. Valid only for NewCredentials logon type.
If not NewCredentials logon, then this will be a '-' string.
Logon GUID [Type = GUID]: a GUID that can help you correlate this event with another event that can contain the same Logon GUID, “4769(S, F): A Kerberos service ticket was requested event on a domain controller.
It also can be used for correlation between a 4624 event and several other events (on the same computer) that can contain the same Logon GUID, “4648(S): A logon was attempted using explicit credentials” and “4964(S): Special groups have been assigned to a new logon.”
This parameter might not be captured in the event, and in that case appears as “{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}”.
NoteGUID is an acronym for 'Globally Unique Identifier'. It is a 128-bit integer number used to identify resources, activities or instances.
Process Information:
Process ID [Type = Pointer]: hexadecimal Process ID of the process that attempted the logon. Process ID (PID) is a number used by the operating system to uniquely identify an active process. To see the PID for a specific process you can, for example, use Task Manager (Details tab, PID column):
If you convert the hexadecimal value to decimal, you can compare it to the values in Task Manager.
You can also correlate this process ID with a process ID in other events, for example, “4688: A new process has been created” Process InformationNew Process ID.
Process Name [Type = UnicodeString]: full path and the name of the executable for the process.
Network Information:
Workstation Name [Type = UnicodeString]: machine name from which logon attempt was performed.
Source Network Address [Type = UnicodeString]: IP address of machine from which logon attempt was performed.
IPv6 address or ::ffff:IPv4 address of a client.
::1 or 127.0.0.1 means localhost.
Source Port [Type = UnicodeString]: source port which was used for logon attempt from remote machine.
- 0 for interactive logons.
Detailed Authentication Information:
Logon Process [Type = UnicodeString]: the name of the trusted logon process that was used for the logon. See event “4611: A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority” description for more information.
Authentication Package [Type = UnicodeString]: The name of the authentication package which was used for the logon authentication process. Default packages loaded on LSA startup are located in “HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLsaOSConfig” registry key. Other packages can be loaded at runtime. When a new package is loaded a “4610: An authentication package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority” (typically for NTLM) or “4622: A security package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority” (typically for Kerberos) event is logged to indicate that a new package has been loaded along with the package name. The most common authentication packages are:
NTLM – NTLM-family Authentication
Kerberos – Kerberos authentication.
Negotiate – the Negotiate security package selects between Kerberos and NTLM protocols. Negotiate selects Kerberos unless it cannot be used by one of the systems involved in the authentication or the calling application did not provide sufficient information to use Kerberos.
Transited Services [Type = UnicodeString] [Kerberos-only]: the list of transmitted services. Transmitted services are populated if the logon was a result of a S4U (Service For User) logon process. S4U is a Microsoft extension to the Kerberos Protocol to allow an application service to obtain a Kerberos service ticket on behalf of a user – most commonly done by a front-end website to access an internal resource on behalf of a user. For more information about S4U, see https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc246072.aspx
Package Name (NTLM only) [Type = UnicodeString]: The name of the LAN Manager sub-package (NTLM-family protocol name) that was used during logon. Possible values are:
“NTLM V1”
“NTLM V2”
“LM”
Only populated if “Authentication Package” = “NTLM”.
Key Length [Type = UInt32]: the length of NTLM Session Security key. Typically it has 128 bit or 56 bit length. This parameter is always 0 if “Authentication Package” = “Kerberos”, because it is not applicable for Kerberos protocol. This field will also have “0” value if Kerberos was negotiated using Negotiate authentication package.
Account Lockout Event Id Windows 2012
Security Monitoring Recommendations
For 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on.
Type of monitoring required | Recommendation |
---|---|
High-value accounts: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action. Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the “New LogonSecurity ID” that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
Anomalies or malicious actions: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the “New LogonSecurity ID” (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
Non-active accounts: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the “New LogonSecurity ID” that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
Account whitelist: You might have a specific whitelist of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the “New LogonSecurity ID” for accounts that are outside the whitelist. |
Accounts of different types: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the “New LogonSecurity ID” to see whether the account type is as expected. |
External accounts: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the “SubjectAccount Domain” corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
Restricted-use computers or devices: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target Computer: (or other target device) for actions performed by the “New LogonSecurity ID” that you are concerned about. |
Account naming conventions: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “SubjectAccount Name” for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
Windows Event Id 6013
Because this event is typically triggered by the SYSTEM account, we recommend that you report it whenever “SubjectSecurity ID” is not SYSTEM.
If “Restricted Admin” mode must be used for logons by certain accounts, use this event to monitor logons by “New LogonSecurity ID” in relation to “Logon Type”=10 and “Restricted Admin Mode”=”Yes”. If “Restricted Admin Mode”=”No” for these accounts, trigger an alert.
If you need to monitor all logon events for accounts with administrator privileges, monitor this event with “Elevated Token”=”Yes”.
If you need to monitor all logon events for managed service accounts and group managed service accounts, monitor for events with “Virtual Account”=”Yes”.
To monitor for a mismatch between the logon type and the account that uses it (for example, if Logon Type 4-Batch or 5-Service is used by a member of a domain administrative group), monitor Logon Type in this event.
If your organization restricts logons in the following ways, you can use this event to monitor accordingly:
If the user account “New LogonSecurity ID” should never be used to log on from the specific Computer:.
If New LogonSecurity ID credentials should not be used from Workstation Name or Source Network Address.
If a specific account, such as a service account, should only be used from your internal IP address list (or some other list of IP addresses). In this case, you can monitor for Network InformationSource Network Address and compare the network address with your list of IP addresses.
If a particular version of NTLM is always used in your organization. In this case, you can use this event to monitor Package Name (NTLM only), for example, to find events where Package Name (NTLM only) does not equal NTLM V2.
If NTLM is not used in your organization, or should not be used by a specific account (New LogonSecurity ID). In this case, monitor for all events where Authentication Package is NTLM.
If the Authentication Package is NTLM. In this case, monitor for Key Length not equal to 128, because all Windows operating systems starting with Windows 2000 support 128-bit Key Length.
If you monitor for potentially malicious software, or software that is not authorized to request logon actions, monitor this event for Process Name.
If you have a trusted logon processes list, monitor for a Logon Process that is not from the list.